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TIME OVER MATTER:  MEASURING THE 
REASONABLENESS OF OFFICER CONDUCT IN 
§ 1983 CLAIMS  
Evelyn Michalos* 
 
In the United States, far more police encounters result in civilian and 
officer deaths than in other democratic countries.  When a government actor 
uses excessive force against an individual during an arrest or investigatory 
stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
seizure, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal civil remedy for that individual. 
In Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that courts should assess the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force 
to seize an individual in light of the “totality of the circumstances,” which 
includes the severity of the crime, whether the suspect actively resisted arrest, 
and whether the suspect posed a threat to the officers and bystanders.  
However, the Court has never delineated how lower courts should assess the 
totality of the circumstances in excessive force claims under § 1983.  Thus, 
circuit courts have applied varying methods to analyze law enforcement’s 
use of force. 
This Note examines whether the Second Circuit’s narrow approach, the 
Third Circuit’s broad approach, or the Seventh Circuit’s segmented 
approach properly identifies the circumstances to consider when measuring 
the reasonableness of officers’ uses of force during a seizure in § 1983 
claims.  This Note compares the three circuit court approaches to how 
Canadian courts evaluate the reasonableness of police conduct in excessive 
force claims. 
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Third Circuit’s approach, which 
considers causally relevant conduct, such as preseizure conduct, is truest to 
the notion of “totality” and should be the uniform method.  As illustrated by 
Canadian courts, this Note argues that the Third Circuit standard 
incorporates de-escalation training as a factor in the reasonableness 
analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Saturday, April 15, 2017, two Fresno County, California, police 
officers shot and killed Isiah Murrietta-Golding, a sixteen-year-old who had 
fled to avoid arrest.1  Isiah’s mother brought a civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for excessive use of force,2 arguing that 
the deadly use of force constituted an unreasonable seizure.3  Isiah’s mother 
asserted that, while investigating a homicide that had occurred the day before, 
a tactical police unit in plain clothes waited outside the home of those 
suspected of the crime.4  When Isiah and his three friends drove away from 
the home, the officers initiated a traffic stop and told the boys to exit their 
vehicle.5  Isiah’s mother alleged the officers had no arrest warrant and no 
search warrant.6  She further contended that the officers ordered the teens to 
walk backward toward the officers with their hands raised while they held 
the teens at gunpoint.7  According to the plaintiff, Isiah was small:  he 
weighed 109 pounds and was five feet four inches tall.8  Isiah ran and the 
officers pursued on foot.9  When one of the officers saw Isiah jump over the 
fence of an empty day care and reach for his waistband, the officer shot Isiah 
in the back of the head.10 
In the United States, individuals are killed during police encounters far 
more often than in other democratic countries.11  England and Wales saw 
roughly fifty-five fatal civilian shootings by police in twenty-four years, 
whereas the United States saw fifty-nine in the first twenty-four days of 
 
 1. See Kristin Lam, A California Police Officer Fatally Shot a 16-Year-Old Boy in Newly 
Released 2017 Video, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2019/10/23/isiah-murrietta-golding-california-police-shooting-debate-
2017-video/2452447001/ [https://perma.cc/49LW-U497]. 
 2. Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury Trial 
at 2, Murrietta-Golding v. City of Fresno, No. 18-CV-0314 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018). 
 3. Id. at 9–10. 
 4. Id. at 6. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lam, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers:  US Police Kill More in Days than Other Countries 
Do in Years, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries [https://perma.cc/F9FS-
B6JF].  See generally Christopher Ingraham, Police Shootings Are a Leading Cause of Death 
for Young American Men, New Research Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2019, 7:14 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/08/police-shootings-are-leading-cause-
death-young-american-men-new-research-shows/ [https://perma.cc/PD6T-4ZTN]. 
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2015.12  In 2019, officers fatally shot 999 persons, over 400 of whom were 
people of color.13  In addition, approximately 214 of the 999 people killed 
had mental illnesses.14  Police use of force is the sixth leading cause of death 
for men ages twenty-five to twenty-nine,15 ranking even higher as a cause of 
death for Black men in this age group.16  From January 2020 to August 2020, 
28 percent of people killed by police were Black, even though only 13 
percent of the U.S. population is Black.17  Data on unarmed victims of police 
use of force display an even starker disparity in fatal encounters for racial 
minorities.18  In 2015, people of color comprised 37.4 percent of the 
population but 62.7 percent of unarmed victims of police use of force.19  
From 2013 to 2020, 17 percent of the total unarmed victims were Black, 14.5 
percent were Hispanic, and 13 percent were white.20 
Individuals harmed by officers’ excessive force, deadly or nondeadly, can 
sue in a civil rights action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 187121 (also 
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act), more commonly known as a § 1983 
claim.22  Section 1983 claims provide plaintiffs with a federal remedy when 
a defendant-officer has violated their constitutional rights while acting under 
color of law.23  Consequently, when officers violate an individual’s Fourth 
 
 12. Lartey, supra note 11.  A 2015 Bureau of Justice Statistics study on contacts between 
the police and the public found that the number of encounters with police involving people 
who were sixteen or older declined from 26 percent to 21 percent between 2011 and 2015. 
ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE 
PUBLIC, 2015, at 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
UF7P-E6YA].  However, from January 2013 to December 2019, police departments in the 
nation’s one hundred largest cities were responsible for 26 percent of deaths resulting from 
encounters with police.  Those police departments killed four times as many unarmed Black 
civilians as unarmed white civilians. Police Accountability Tool, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, 
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/cities [https://perma.cc/4GYE-QUXZ] (last visited Nov. 3, 
2020).  Black, Native American, and Hispanic persons face a higher risk of being killed by 
police than white persons. Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force 
in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PNAS 16,793, 16,793 (2019). 
 13. Julie Tate et al., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/ [https://perma.cc/4VWW-KSHQ] (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2020). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Ingraham, supra note 11.  See generally Edwards et al., supra note 12. 
 16. See Police Violence Map, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpolice 
violence.org [https://perma.cc/GBY8-P9DQ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Jon Swaine et al., Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as Likely to Be 
Unarmed as White People, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015, 8:38 AM), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-by-police-analysis 
[https://perma.cc/7HMT-5U3Q]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Police Violence Map, supra note 16. 
 21. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 and 42 U.S.C). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Jeremy R. Lacks, Note, The Lone American Dictatorship:  
How Court Doctrine and Police Culture Limit Judicial Oversight of the Police Use of Deadly 
Force, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 391, 392 (2008). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made 
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 
‘under color of’ state law.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States 
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Amendment right against unreasonable seizure by using unreasonable force 
in light of the “totality of the circumstances,” the individual may bring a 
§ 1983 claim against the officer.24  However, circuit courts are divided on 
whether “totality of the circumstances” should include preseizure conduct,25 
officers’ conduct only at the moment of seizure,26 or a segmented time 
frame.27 
Canadian excessive force cases provide a useful comparison to the 
different approaches circuit courts have taken in the United States.  Canada 
is the most useful comparison because of its geographic proximity to the 
United States, its Charter of Rights and Freedoms—which grants a guarantee 
against unreasonable seizure similar to the Fourth Amendment—and its rule 
authorizing police to employ lethal force only when they reasonably believe 
suspects pose an imminent threat of serious injury or death to officers or 
others.28  In addition, the Criminal Code of Canada prescribes factors courts 
must consider in excessive force cases that are similar to the Graham v. 
Connor29 factors laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court.30  Like the Third 
Circuit, Canadian courts review relevant context to determine the 
reasonableness of officers’ actions in excessive force claims.31  Canadian 
courts also review officers’ preseizure conduct and consider, among other 
factors, whether police attempted to de-escalate the situation.32 
This Note recommends federal courts use a standardized view of totality 
of the circumstances that properly assesses the reasonableness of officers’ 
use of force when arresting, stopping, or otherwise seizing civilians.  
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Third Circuit uses the most effective 
standard:  totality of the circumstances should include causally relevant 
preseizure conduct regarding an officer’s use of force and should incorporate 
insights from Canadian law. 
Part I of this Note describes the historical and legal context of § 1983 
claims vis-à-vis the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Part II examines the Second, Third, and Seventh 
Circuits’ differing analyses of the totality of the circumstances and outlines 
various legal and policy arguments for each view.  It then compares the U.S. 
circuit courts’ approaches to Canadian courts’ views and explores the 
differences.  Part III concludes that the Third Circuit’s method is truest to the 
notion of “totality,” as it (1) includes police actions leading up to the seizure 
 
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Tennessee 
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
 25. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 26. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 27. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 28. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 29. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 30. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 31. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 32. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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that are causally relevant to the force later used, (2) provides a fair 
mechanism by which both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ perspectives may be 
heard, and (3) allows courts to consider accepted police practices, 
particularly de-escalation, in the reasonableness analysis.33 
I.  USE OF FORCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can bring claims against officers for 
violating their constitutional rights while acting under color of law.34  
Congress enacted this statute to enforce liberties protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.35 
Part I.A provides an overview of § 1983 and its history, the risks involved 
when officers utilize deadly force, and the disproportionate impact of police 
violence on people of color and those with mental illnesses.  Part I.B briefly 
describes the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures.  
Finally, Part I.C reviews two key excessive force cases in which the Supreme 
Court interpreted and refined the Fourth Amendment totality of the 
circumstances standard in the § 1983 context. 
A.  Excessive Force Under § 1983:  Risks of the Use of Deadly Force and 
Disproportionate Impacts 
Congress enacted § 1983 as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act,36 one of 
the Reconstruction civil rights acts, to enforce Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures.37  Section 1983 
applies to government actors (including both state and local officials), private 
parties acting under state authorization, and some private parties acting 
alone.38  Under the common law, police could use lethal force in self-defense 
or to stop fleeing felons,39 which allowed states to exercise their police 
powers without federal intrusion.40  However, under § 1983, any person 
acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” 
of any state, territory, or the District of Columbia, who deprives people of 
their constitutional or federal rights could be subject to civil liability.41  Thus, 
§ 1983 provides a civil action to protect individuals against the misuse of 
state power.42 
 
 33. See infra Part III.A. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 35. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973). 
 36. ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 37. See Carter, 409 U.S. at 423; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871). 
 38. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (finding a policy of 
the New York City Department of Social Services and Board of Education that forced 
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence unconstitutional in a § 1983 suit brought 
by a female). 
 39. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131, *132–33 (stating that public justice 
homicide occurs when an officer kills an assaulter or “attempts to take a man charged with 
felony, and is resisted; and, in the endeavour to take him, kills him”). 
 40. Lacks, supra note 22, at 399. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 42. See id. 
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1.  Protecting Civil Liberties 
Plaintiffs bringing § 1983 claims must prove two essential elements:  (1) 
a person acted under color of state, territory, or District of Columbia law; and 
(2) the person’s actions deprived the plaintiff of “rights, privileges, or 
immunities” guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or federal law.43  The term 
“person” includes police, cities, mayors, departments of social services, and 
school boards.44 
Congress enacted § 1983 to ensure principles of civil freedom and justice, 
thereby guaranteeing constitutional rights such as life and property.45  
Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, also known as “the third force bill,” 
with the Ku Klux Klan’s lawless and brutal behavior in mind, among other 
unlawful activities in the Southern states.46  The statute sought to address 
state actors’ failure to give citizens equal protection of the law, either due to 
inability or unwillingness to do so.47  Representative George Hoar 
highlighted the statute’s purpose “to insure that under no temptation of party 
spirit, under no political excitement, under no jealousy of race or caste, will 
the majority either in numbers or strength in any State seek to deprive the 
remainder of the population of their civil rights.”48 
From 1871 to 1920, federal courts decided only twenty-one § 1983 claims, 
nine of which reached the Supreme Court.49  In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,50 
the Court reinvigorated § 1983 claims by making police officers civilly liable 
for illegal acts committed without state authorization.51  In Monroe, thirteen 
officers forced the plaintiff and his wife to stand naked in their living room 
while police searched their apartment until they were later arrested without a 
warrant.52  The Court held that the officers’ warrantless and unreasonable 
search and seizure constituted action under color of law cognizable under 
§ 1983.53  The Court further expanded § 1983’s scope in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services,54 holding that the statute also covers 
municipalities and other local government units whose customs, policies, or 
 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). 
 45. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 182–83 (1961), overruled on other grounds by 
Monell, 436 U.S. 658. 
 46. See id. at 174.  In debates over the Act, congressmen constantly referred to an over-
600-page joint select committee report investigating conditions in the South.  The report 
detailed testimonies on the Klan’s raids, murders, and other violent acts and described the state 
governments’ weak responses. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1871); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 42-22, pt. 1, at 2–3 (1872). 
 47. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176. 
 48. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335. 
 49. See The Civil Rights Act:  Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. 
L.J. 361, 363–66 (1951) (stating that federal courts rarely adjudicated § 1983 claims before 
1920). 
 50. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell, 436 U.S. 658. 
 51. Id. at 187. 
 52. Id. at 169. 
 53. Id. at 187. 
 54. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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practices deprive individuals of their constitutional or federal rights.55  The 
next section examines the effect of such deprivation. 
2.  The Dangers and Disparate Effects of Utilizing Force 
Excessive force, especially deadly force, raises serious human rights 
concerns, including the rights to life, security of one’s person, freedom from 
discrimination, and equal protection under the law.56  Because law 
enforcement officers undertake to protect, serve, and respect human life 
while promoting public safety through lawful means,57 communities largely 
rely on officers’ responsiveness and professional judgment when officers 
engage with the public.58  However, Amnesty International has argued that 
the frequency of shootings by police shows that lethal force 
disproportionately affects certain persons, including different social groups, 
based on age, gender, and race.59  Disparities may be exacerbated by previous 
federal law not requiring police departments to report lethal encounters.60 
Another study found that police are more likely to use deadly force against 
Black individuals, Native American individuals, and Hispanic men and 
suggested that the risk of death is highest for Black men.61  On average, Black 
men have a one in one thousand chance of being killed by police as compared 
to a one in 2000 chance for men overall, and a one in 33,000 chance for 
women.62  Individuals of all ethnic groups face the highest risk of being killed 
by police between the ages of twenty and thirty-five.63  And geographical 
differences amplify racial inequity.64 
In addition, police frequently encounter people with mental disabilities.65  
Officers may arrest people for crimes or take them to health facilities after 
 
 55. See id. at 694. 
 56. AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY FORCE:  POLICE USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/aiusa_deadlyforcereportjune2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LMG6-Y6WS]. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 10. 
 60. See Gretchen Frazee, Deadly Police Shootings Keep Happening.  Data Could Be a 
Missing Piece, PBS (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/deadly-police-
shootings-keep-happening-data-could-be-a-missing-piece [https://perma.cc/G453-RBNL].  A 
retired Salt Lake City, Utah, police officer and vice president of the Center for Policing Equity 
observed:  “[Police departments] can tell me how many cars are stolen, but they can’t tell you 
how many people they killed?” Id. 
 61. Edwards et al., supra note 12, at 16,793. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Police Violence Map, supra note 16.  For example, in 2013, Buffalo, New York, 
had a population of 258,959, 50 percent of residents were nonwhite, and the violent crime rate 
was twelve murders per one thousand residents.  Orlando, Florida, had a population of 255,483 
in 2013, 42 percent of residents were nonwhite, and the violent crime rate was nine murders 
per one thousand residents.  Despite the lower crime rate, Orlando police fatally shot and killed 
thirteen people from 2013 to 2016, whereas Buffalo police killed no one. Id. 
 65. See Serving Safely:  The National Initiative to Enhance Policing for Persons with 
Mental Illnesses and Developmental Disabilities, VERA INST. OF JUST. 1 (Feb. 2019), https:// 
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observing worrying behavior.66  However, encounters can escalate.67  From 
January to August 2019, at least 20 percent of individuals fatally shot by 
police had mental health concerns.68 
3.  Police Deaths in the Line of Duty 
The Washington Post database suggests police shot and killed 999 people 
in 2019.69  According to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial 
Fund, in that same year, 128 police officers died in the line of duty.70  The 
median age was forty-three.71  In the first half of 2020, twenty-seven police 
officers were shot and killed in the line of duty.72  Although police deaths in 
the line of duty decreased in the first half of 2020 by 14 percent as compared 
to the first half of 2019,73 the number of annual police fatalities has not been 
below one hundred since 1944.74 
Accordingly, when to use deadly force constitutes one of law 
enforcement’s most difficult and potentially irreversible decisions.75  In 
Graham, the Supreme Court recognized an officer’s need for split-second 
decision-making.76  Studies have found that the high rate of civilian deaths 
by police in the United States is partly due to the nation’s high crime and 
individual gun ownership rates, which often create tense situations in which 
 
www.vera.org/downloads/publications/serving-safely-fact-sheet-policing-mental-illness-
disabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7U4-B8TQ]. 
 66. See Michael Avery, Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People:  Defining the 
Totality of Circumstances Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force Against Emotionally 
Disturbed People, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 264 (2003). 
 67. See id. at 264–65. 
 68. See Ingraham, supra note 11. 
 69. See Tate et al., supra note 13. 
 70. 128 Law Enforcement Officer Fatalities Nationwide in 2019, NAT’L L. ENF’T 
OFFICERS MEM’L FUND, https://nleomf.org/newsroom/news-releases/128-law-enforcement-
officer-fatalities-nationwide-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/D57M-GBJC] (last visited Nov. 3, 
2020).  Of those deaths, forty-nine were gun-related, which was 6 percent less than in 2018. 
See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See NAT’L L. ENF’T OFFICERS MEM’L FUND, 2020 MID-YEAR PRELIMINARY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FATALITIES REPORT 4 (2020), https://nleomf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/2020-Mid-Year-Fatality-Report_v6_8_3_20_opt.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VA5C-2FHK]. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See 128 Law Enforcement Officer Fatalities Nationwide in 2019, supra note 70. 
 75. William A. Geller & Kevin J. Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police:  
Uncommon Crises (pt. 2), 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 331, 371 (1982). 
 76. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).  Officers may be immune from 
personal liability if they reasonably but mistakenly believed the law permitted their use of 
force under the circumstances. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Qualified 
immunity protects police from liability, as well as harassment and distraction from 
unsubstantiated claims, when officers perform reasonably in the course of their duties. Pearson 
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
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officers fear for their lives.77  In 2019, over half of individuals shot and killed 
by police were armed.78 
While international standards require officers to de-escalate situations and 
exhaust all other reasonable alternatives before using lethal force, the U.S. 
constitutional standard does not require police to use the least intrusive means 
to seize individuals.79  The Fourth Amendment permits officers to use any 
reasonable means under the totality of the circumstances when seizing a 
person.80 
B.  Unreasonable Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment 
The Framers’ immediate concerns when drafting the Fourth Amendment 
were general warrants and writs of assistance, which gave officials 
unrestrained power to search and seize people and property at will.81  Such 
sweeping searches and seizures offended colonists largely because they were 
conducted “without any evidentiary basis.”82 
In response, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”83  It holds government officials accountable by 
requiring them to conduct seizures reasonably and pursuant to valid 
warrants.84  However, officials may, among other exceptions, temporarily 
seize people without a warrant to conduct a brief investigatory stop if they 
have “reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts”85 that 
“criminal activity is afoot.”86  This objective standard requires more than 
guesswork but less than probable cause.87  One must consider the seizure’s 
circumstances as a whole, and the seizure must be based on particularized 
facts.88 
 
 77. See Brendan O’Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, How Fear Contributes to Cops’ Use of Deadly 
Force, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 1, 2019, 6:00 AM), https:// 
www.themarshallproject.org/2019/05/01/can-understanding-fear-mitigate-police-violence 
[https://perma.cc/5XSY-A6HK]. 
 78. See Ingraham, supra note 11. 
 79. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543, 556–57 (1976); see also Avery, supra note 66, at 298.  But see Use of Force:  
Attorney General’s Use of Force Policy, NJ.GOV (June 2000), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/ 
agguide/useofforce2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A8D-Q7EB] (noting New Jersey’s policy that 
officers should try all other reasonable means before using force). 
 80. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1985); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 394–
96. 
 81. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original 
Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1242–44 (2016). 
 82. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 81, at 82; Claire Abrahamson, Note, Guilt 
by Genetic Association:  The Fourth Amendment and the Search of Private Genetic Databases 
by Law Enforcement, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2539, 2555 (2019). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985). 
 86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 87. See id. at 22. 
 88. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
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Police stopping a pedestrian on the street may constitute a “seizure.”89  
However, not all encounters between police and civilians are seizures.90  For 
a seizure to occur, a government actor must restrict a person’s liberty by 
physical force or a show of authority to which the person submits.91  Officers 
show authority when, under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable 
persons would not feel “free to leave.”92  This is an objective standard.93 
In Michigan v. Chesternut,94 the Supreme Court identified some police 
actions that may constitute a seizure.95  These included activating sirens, 
commanding a person to halt, displaying weapons, or aggressively driving to 
restrain a person’s movement.96  In Chesternut, the Court found that four 
officers did not sufficiently assert authority when they briefly accelerated 
their cruiser and drove around a corner to drive alongside a fleeing 
pedestrian.97 
When determining the objective reasonableness of a seizure, courts 
examine the officer’s conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances.98  
This analysis must be done from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 
the scene, rather than using hindsight.99  Because the reasonableness standard 
is objective, courts do not consider officers’ subjective beliefs, or even ill 
intentions, to determine whether their use of force was reasonable.100 
C.  The Fourth Amendment in Use of Force Cases:  Garner & Graham 
To prevail in excessive force claims under § 1983, plaintiffs must prove 
that an officer’s conduct constituted a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.101  The Supreme Court has adjudicated two major excessive 
force cases:  Tennessee v. Garner102 and Graham. 
In Garner, an officer investigating an alleged nighttime burglary saw 
someone scaling the backyard fence, ordered him to stop, and shot him in the 
head when he did not.103  The defendant-officer had killed an eighth grader 
who had stolen ten dollars and a purse from an unoccupied house.104  The 
defendant admitted that he fired to prevent escape and reasonably believed 
the teenager was unarmed.105  The Court held that using deadly force 
 
 89. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. 
 90. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980). 
 91. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1991). 
 92. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
 95. Id. at 575. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 575–76. 
 98. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). 
 99. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 100. Id. at 397; see also Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
officers’ intentions and motivations are irrelevant to the reasonableness inquiry). 
 101. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. 
 102. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 103. Id. at 3–4. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 3. 
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constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
standard106—and the Fourth Amendment does not require police to exhaust 
every alternative before turning to lethal force.107  Nonetheless, the Court 
struck down the Tennessee statute at issue as unconstitutional because it 
authorized deadly force against any fleeing felon.108 
Under Garner, deadly force is reasonable only when necessary to prevent 
escape or when officers have probable cause to believe that the suspect 
significantly threatens serious bodily injury or death to officers or others.109  
After weighing the government’s law enforcement interests against the 
teenager’s interest in life, the Court declared it better for some felony 
suspects to escape than for any to die.110 
In Graham, the Court expanded Garner’s holding to the use of nondeadly 
force.111  The plaintiff, Dethorne Graham, was diabetic and went with his 
friend Berry to a convenience store to buy orange juice to counteract an 
insulin reaction.112  Seeing the long checkout line, Graham left the store and 
asked Berry to drive him elsewhere.113  The defendant, Officer Connor, 
became suspicious when he saw Graham leave the store quickly and initiated 
an investigative stop.  Officer Connor told Graham to wait until the officer 
confirmed if anything had happened at the store, despite Graham’s 
explanation that he was diabetic.114  When Officer Connor called for backup, 
Graham exited Berry’s car, ran around it, sat down on the curb, and passed 
out.115  When other officers arrived, they handcuffed Graham on the sidewalk 
and lifted him onto the hood of Berry’s car.116  Graham regained 
consciousness and asked the officers to check for a diabetic decal in his 
wallet, but the officers told him to “shut up” and threw him into the police 
car.117  The officers also prevented Graham from drinking orange juice that 
a friend had brought during the encounter.118  The officers only released 
Graham once they discovered he had done nothing wrong.119  As a result of 
the incident, Graham sustained a broken foot, bruised forehead, and an 
injured shoulder, among other injuries.120  The Court held that all excessive 
force claims arising from an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure should 
be analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth 
 
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. See id. at 11–12, 20–21; Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003); Plakas 
v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 108. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.  At that time, the law in many states permitted the use of force 
against any fleeing felon. Id. at 12–13. 
 109. Id. at 3. 
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 112. Id. at 388. 
 113. Id. at 388–89. 
 114. Id. at 389. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 390. 
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Amendment.121  Therefore, when police use unreasonable deadly or 
nondeadly force in an arrest or investigatory stop, the use of undue force 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.122 
Claims of police misconduct may also be brought under other 
constitutional provisions, such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses.123  However, because excessive force involves 
government intrusion on individuals that the Fourth Amendment explicitly 
prohibits, excessive force claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment 
objective reasonableness standard, rather than as substantive due process 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.124  Accordingly, plaintiffs must 
show that the force an officer employed was objectively unreasonable in light 
of the totality of the circumstances.125 
Although the reasonableness test has no precise definition or 
application,126 the Court, in Garner, had explained that to examine the 
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, courts must balance the governmental 
interests behind the intrusion against the individual’s privacy interests.127  To 
balance these two interests, Graham identified three main factors to consider:  
(1) the nature and severity of the crime that led to the arrest or investigatory 
stop, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers or 
others, and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted or fled to avoid arrest.128 
Graham gave courts discretion to carefully consider the particular facts 
and circumstances of each case.129  Graham emphasized that officers often 
face dangerous and unpredictable situations that may require split-second 
decisions.130  Circuit courts have applied these factors in § 1983 cases 
involving various types of force, such as the use of choke holds131 or 
tasers.132 
 
 121. Id. at 394–95. 
 122. See id. at 394; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
 123. See generally Wayne C. Beyer, Police Misconduct:  Claims and Defenses Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, 30 URB. LAW. 65 (1998). 
 124. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.  In his concurrence, Justice Harry Blackmun asserted that 
Garner did not foreclose the use of substantive due process analysis as an alternative to Fourth 
Amendment analysis in pre-arrest excessive force claims. Id. at 399–400 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 125. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 21. 
 126. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 127. See Garner 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
 128. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 397. 
 131. See, e.g., Werner v. City of Poulsbo, 548 F. App’x 381, 382 (9th Cir. 2013) (analyzing 
a § 1983 claim for an officer’s use of a choke hold that caused the plaintiff to have breathing 
difficulties); Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying immunity 
for an officer’s use of a choke hold during arrest that resulted in five collapsed vertebrae in 
the suspect’s spine). 
 132. See, e.g., Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that tasing 
a suspect who was threatening officers and store customers with a four-inch knife was 
reasonable); Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 493 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that using a stun gun 
on a fleeing person suspected of serious drug crimes was not excessive); Yates v. Terry, 817 
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Yet, the Graham factors did not delineate at what point before a seizure a 
plaintiff’s or officer’s preseizure conduct should be considered.133  Thus, 
Graham and Garner did not provide a particular time line for the totality of 
the circumstances.134  The next part analyzes three circuits’ methods of 
assessing the totality of the circumstances in light of Garner and Graham. 
II.  THE DIFFERENT TOTALITY TESTS 
Because the Supreme Court has not provided a conclusive test for which 
temporal circumstances to include when determining the reasonableness of 
officers’ actions, the lower federal courts have developed differing tests, 
some narrow and some more inclusive.  Part II.A analyzes the Second 
Circuit, Third Circuit, and Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, commentators’ 
views, and policy considerations.  Part II.A.1 examines the Third Circuit’s 
broad causation framework, which includes relevant preseizure conduct as 
part of the totality of the circumstances.  Part II.A.2 examines the Second 
Circuit’s narrow framework, which focuses on the moment seizure occurs. 
Part II.A.3 examines the Seventh Circuit’s segmented framework.  Finally, 
Part II.B evaluates Canadian jurisprudence by discussing the “reasonable 
grounds” standard for officers to employ nondeadly or deadly force and 
factors Canadian courts use to analyze whether the use of force was justified.  
Part II.B then highlights circumstances Canadian courts consider in 
evaluating excessive force claims as they align with or differ from the 
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits. 
A.  U.S. Circuit Courts:  Relevant Circumstances in Assessing 
Reasonableness 
The circuit courts all consider plaintiffs’ preseizure actions as part of the 
totality of the circumstances because a suspect’s actions are relevant to an 
officer’s subsequent decisions and use of force.135  Only a few of the circuits, 
however, consider officers’ preseizure actions as part of the totality of the 
circumstances and, therefore, relevant to the reasonableness analysis.136 
 
F.3d 877, 885–86 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that tasing a suspect, who did not resist arrest, three 
times was unreasonable). 
 133. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 134. See Avery, supra note 66, at 265. 
 135. See, e.g., Hensley ex rel. North Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d 573, 582 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(noting that the plaintiff emerged from a house with a gun, hit an officer, and advanced toward 
other officers), cert. denied sub nom., Price v. Hensley, 138 S. Ct. 1595 (2018); Zion v. 
Nassan, 556 F. App’x 103, 109 (3d Cir. 2014) (assessing whether the suspect colliding with a 
parked car and driving away at a slow speed put officers or others in significant danger); Plakas 
v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994) (considering the suspect’s decision to avoid 
arrest and charge at officers with a fireplace poker). 
 136. See Hensley, 876 F.3d at 582 (assessing the circumstances, focusing on the suspect’s 
actions immediately prior to and at the moment deputies killed the suspect); Zion, 556 F. 
App’x at 107 (analyzing causally relevant actions by both the plaintiffs and the defendants, 
where the officers followed the suspect despite orders to discontinue pursuit and fired at the 
suspect when he drove forward at a slow speed); Plakas, 19 F.3d at 1150 (dividing relevant 
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1.  The Third Circuit’s Broad Approach 
In Abraham v. Raso,137 the Third Circuit held that the reasonableness 
inquiry requires courts to consider relevant events and officer conduct 
leading up to the moment officers seize someone.138  When analyzing the 
totality of the circumstances in excessive force claims, the First, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits follow this interpretation to consider context and causes 
before a seizure occurred.139  However, the circuit courts following the Third 
Circuit’s framework acknowledge that not all factors may be equally 
relevant.140  One must examine preseizure conduct in terms of its causal 
relevance to the use of force.141 
a.  An Inclusive Time Line of Totality of the Circumstances:  Causally 
Relevant Conduct 
In Abraham, the decedent Robert Abraham stole clothes from a Macy’s 
store.142  Officer Kimberly Raso, an off-duty police officer working as a 
security guard, followed Abraham to his parked car.143  When Abraham 
entered his car, Raso told him to stop, but Abraham backed his car out and 
hit another car.144  When he began driving forward, Raso shot toward 
Abraham’s car.145  Shattering the driver’s side window, Raso’s bullet struck 
Abraham’s left arm and passed into his chest.146  Abraham was pronounced 
dead on arrival at a nearby hospital.147 
Reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Raso, 
the Third Circuit emphasized that Garner made it unreasonable for police to 
employ deadly force against fleeing felons who did not pose a significant 
threat to officers or bystanders.148  Here, the evidence suggested that Raso 
did not stand in front of Abraham’s car and, if Raso had, a jury could 
 
time frames and analyzing the reasonableness of an officer’s responses to the plaintiff’s 
actions in each). 
 137. 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 138. Id. at 291–92. 
 139. See Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that provocation 
that may constitute a constitutional violation should be analyzed separately, although “an 
officer [who] intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation 
is an independent Fourth Amendment violation . . . may be held liable for his otherwise 
defensive use of deadly force”), abrogated by County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 
1539 (2017); Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that, in some 
cases, courts should consider police conduct that created the need to use lethal force); St. 
Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that the court should consider 
police actions leading up to a shooting in assessing the seizure’s reasonableness); see also 
Avery, supra note 66, at 282. 
 140. See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 292. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at 283. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 284–85. 
 145. Id. at 285. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 286. 
 148. Id. at 288. 
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reasonably have found that Raso moved safely out of the way before shooting 
Abraham.149 
Abraham rejected a narrow interpretation of Supreme Court case law that 
held that actions before the exact moment a seizure occurred cannot be 
considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.150  The Third Circuit 
found the narrow approach too rigid, stating that it would lead to absurd 
results; for instance, because seizure technically occurs the moment the bullet 
hits the plaintiff, this narrow rule would exclude the moment the officer 
pulled the trigger.151 
Whereas in Garner and Graham, the Supreme Court focused on the 
recognition of split-second decision-making in tense situations, the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Abraham focused on the totality language and took a 
broader approach.152  The Third Circuit emphasized that the three Graham 
factors do not exclude other factors, including officers’ preseizure 
conduct.153  Other factors may include:  (1) the type of force used, (2) the 
context in which police used that force, (3) the extent of the injury inflicted, 
(4) whether the person was armed, (5) whether the person was sober,154 (6) 
whether the person interfered or attempted to interfere in officers’ execution 
of their duties, and (7) the number of arrestees or officers involved.155  For 
example, if a person possesses a firearm, flees, or commits a felony, officers 
reasonably can use greater force in seizing that individual as compared to an 
unarmed person who stops when ordered to do so.156 
b.  Arguments for the Third Circuit’s Framework:  True Totality and 
Fairness to Both Parties 
Some commentators view the Third Circuit’s approach as truest to the 
totality language established by Graham and Garner, while sufficiently 
providing limits to the relevant time line.157  The Third Circuit’s framework 
requires courts to consider only causally relevant preseizure conduct that has 
a bearing on the police’s use of force that effectively seized the individual.158  
Professor Cynthia Lee asserted that what officers do or fail to do “that 
increased the risk of a deadly confrontation” is merely part of the totality of 
 
 149. Id. at 294. 
 150. Id. at 291 (rejecting a narrow interpretation of Hodari D. that suggests a person is not 
seized until the bullet actually strikes). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 292. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., Loharsingh v. City of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
 155. See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1170 (11th Cir. 2000); Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 
F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 
(3d Cir. 2007); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 156. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
 157. See, e.g., Aaron Kimber, Note, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable Seizure?:  The 
Relevance of an Officer’s Pre-seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 651, 676 (2004); see also Avery, supra note 66, at 287. 
 158. Abraham, 183 F.3d at 292. 
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the circumstances that fact finders must consider, and the reasonableness 
standard is purposely broad to include all relevant facts.159  Professor Lee 
noted that, in the context of de-escalation training, police chiefs and others 
are increasingly recognizing the importance of officers’ decisions leading up 
to the moment they use force.160 
In his Note, Aaron Kimber highlighted the notion in Abraham that 
“‘totality’ is an encompassing word,”161 which considers both suspects’ and 
officers’ actions as pertinent information for the reasonableness test.162  
According to Kimber, by using an inclusive time line, courts more accurately 
understand suspects’ actions in response to officers’ actions, and vice versa, 
leading up to the moment officers exerted force.163 
Another scholar asserted Graham explicitly identified the severity of the 
crime as a factor courts must consider and, therefore, supports the Third 
Circuit’s consideration of causally relevant conduct because a crime’s 
severity requires courts to contextualize the interaction beyond the moment 
the seizure occurred.164  The crime also helps courts understand officers’ 
initial tactics and civilians’ responses in the chain of events leading to the 
choice to exercise force.165 
Scholars favoring the Third Circuit’s causal approach contend it most 
closely reaches a practical bright-line rule courts can use in deciding which 
factors, temporal and otherwise, may be considered in the reasonableness 
analysis.166  One commentator emphasized that the method relies on already 
familiar legal principles of causation where officers may have created the 
circumstances that required force and the civilian’s response might constitute 
a superseding cause.167 
2.  The Second Circuit’s Narrow Approach 
In Salim v. Proulx,168 the Second Circuit held that courts should consider 
only officers’ knowledge and actions immediately before and at the moment 
 
 159. Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force:  De-escalation, 
Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 679, 684.  
Professor Lee further explains that even if an officer increased the risk of a deadly encounter 
by acting negligently or violating police procedures, a jury could still find that the officer’s 
use of force was reasonable. Id. at 685. 
 160. Id. at 673. 
 161. Abraham, 183 F.3d at 291. 
 162. Kimber, supra note 157, at 676. 
 163. Id. (“The incident is the combination of all the interactions between the actors 
involved, so there is no reason why the actions of one of those actors should always be 
excluded.”). 
 164. See Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap:  Untangling the Chain of Events in 
Excessive Force Claims, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 17–18 (2017). 
 165. Id. at 28. 
 166. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 66, at 287 (“The Third Circuit’s decision in Abraham v. 
Raso provides the clearest rule, and the one giving the word ‘totality’ in the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ standard its truest meaning.”); see also McClellan, supra note 164, at 22–23. 
 167. See McClellan, supra note 164, at 22–23. 
 168. 93 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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they seized the plaintiff with deadly force.169  The Fourth,170 Fifth,171 
Eighth,172 and Eleventh Circuits173 also examine reasonableness at the 
moment seizure occurs.  In the case of fleeing suspects, this framework is 
grounded in the notion that no seizure occurs until an officer uses force to 
stop a fleeing suspect because the suspect did not submit to the first 
demonstration of police authority.174  This framework also contemplates the 
need for instant decision-making in dangerous situations.175 
a.  A Narrow Time Line of Totality of the Circumstances:  Immediately 
Before and at the Moment of Seizure 
In Salim, the Second Circuit established its narrow view while examining 
an incident where the defendant, Officer William Proulx, attempted to 
apprehend fourteen-year-old Eric Reyes, who had escaped from juvenile 
detention and evaded arrest twice.176  Officer Proulx saw Reyes near Reyes’s 
home and pursued him when Reyes ran.177  Reyes threw a rock that hit the 
officer’s arm and head.178  Officer Proulx fired a warning shot, believing 
Reyes had a knife; Reyes was in fact unarmed.179  After the officer caught 
Reyes and they fell to the ground, a five-minute struggle ensued in which 
children between the ages of eight and twelve came and began hitting Officer 
Proulx.180  The officer had a handgun in his pocket and wore plain clothes.181  
 
 169. Id. at 92. 
 170. See, e.g., Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996) (focusing on the moment 
immediately before firing, where the decedent had his finger on the trigger of a hidden gun 
while handcuffed, seated in the police car with the seat belt fastened and the window up, and 
the officers stood nearby); Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that Graham requires the fact finder to examine the officer’s actions immediately prior to and 
at the moment she made the split-second judgment to shoot and should exclude evidence of 
the officer’s actions leading up to the moment immediately before the shooting). 
 171. See, e.g., Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1992) (analyzing 
the moment of fatal shooting when the decedent tried to hit an officer with his truck, focusing 
less on the plainclothes officer’s failure to identify himself). 
 172. See, e.g., Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he reasonableness 
inquiry extends only to those facts known to the officer at the precise moment the officers 
effectuate the seizure.”); cf. Avery, supra note 66, at 282. 
 173. See, e.g., Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990, 995 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
officers did not seize the emotionally disturbed decedent when they entered her home, 
surrounded her, and confined her to a bedroom, because she still had sufficient freedom to 
respond, and that seizure occurred only when the officers killed her after she fired at them). 
 174. See Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]re-seizure conduct is 
not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”).  But see Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 
(3d Cir. 1999) (expressing disagreement with courts that have held that the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness analysis requires fact finders to exclude “any evidence of events preceding the 
actual ‘seizure’”). 
 175. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 176. Id. at 88. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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Officer Proulx saw Reyes’s hand touch the gun and he fatally shot Reyes as 
a result.182 
The plaintiff, Reyes’s mother, argued that Officer Proulx created the 
situation where deadly force became likely to occur by violating several 
police procedures leading up to the shooting.183  The plaintiff tried to frame 
the incident as one in which the officer unreasonably used deadly force to 
arrest Reyes or prevent Reyes from escaping.184  However, the court 
considered a narrower time line in determining the totality of the 
circumstances and viewed the situation as one of self-defense where the 
“‘immediate threat’ criterion controls” the analysis.185 
When describing the circumstances, the court focused on the moment 
Officer Proulx fired the weapon.186  Under that framework, the court 
considered that, at the moment Officer Proulx shot Reyes:  (1) the officer had 
pinned Reyes down, (2) Reyes was actively resisting, (3) other children were 
hitting the officer, and (4) the officer believed Reyes’s hand had touched the 
officer’s gun.187  The court found that these facts created the possibility 
Reyes might gain control of the gun.188  Thus, the court found reasonable the 
officer’s decision to shoot Reyes fatally because other reasonable officers in 
that position would have done the same.189 
The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that evidence of officers’ 
preseizure conduct creating the need to use deadly force is irrelevant to the 
reasonableness analysis.190  Rather than including whether the officer created 
the situation as another factor to consider, the court asserted “[t]he 
reasonableness inquiry depends only upon the officer’s knowledge of 
circumstances immediately prior to and at the moment that he made the split-
second decision to employ deadly force.”191  Yet, the court did not discuss 
the totality of the circumstances standard.192 
b.  Arguments for the Second Circuit’s Framework:  Hindsight, 
Overdeterrence, and Irrelevant Police Conduct 
Professor Lee has emphasized the importance of recognizing that officers 
risk their lives to protect the public and sometimes must decide on a course 
of action quickly in fast-changing situations with only the information 
available to them at the time, which could ultimately turn out to be wrong.193  
The Second Circuit’s narrow approach accounts for the split-second 
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decisions officers must often make in the line of duty.194  The narrow view 
also heeds Graham’s notion that courts should proceed with caution and not 
second-guess police actions with the luxury of twenty-twenty hindsight.195 
As a public policy concern, Professor Lawrence Rosenthal has argued that 
including officers’ preseizure conduct in the reasonableness analysis of their 
use of force would make it easier to impose liability on officers, which could 
lead to “over-deterrence.”196  Officers may increasingly hesitate to enforce 
laws out of fear of liability, which could endanger civilians’ and officers’ 
lives by encouraging offenders to commit more crimes.197  Professor John 
Jeffries has further explained that, in response to the threat of legal claims, 
officers might make choices that seek to minimize the costs of their actions, 
such as choosing inaction.198 
The narrow view also protects officers who are simply negligent, which 
comports with the Fifth Circuit’s assertion in Fraire v. City of Arlington199 
that an officer’s creation of the circumstances giving rise to force, like in 
Salim, where the officer did not follow police procedure,200 is negligence at 
most but not a constitutional violation under § 1983.201 
Another argument for the narrow view is that it may be more in line with 
what the Supreme Court considers a seizure under California v. Hodari D.,202 
in which the Supreme Court defined what constitutes a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Because seizure does not occur until an officer uses 
physical force or shows authority to which a person submits, an officer’s 
actions before using force may not be part of the actual seizure.203  An 
officer’s actions before the actual moment of seizure, such as when an officer 
uses lethal force or nondeadly force like a choke hold, would be ignored 
under the narrow view.204  Thus, even when plaintiffs argue that police 
actions before the shooting created the eventual need to shoot and that police 
could have acted in a way that would have required less force, courts 
following the narrow view disregard this evidence.205 
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3.  The Seventh Circuit’s Segmented Approach 
In Plakas v. Drinski,206 the Seventh Circuit divided the circumstances 
surrounding the use of force into segments and examined the reasonableness 
of police conduct in each segment individually.207  The court provided a 
somewhat vague rule about how to “carve up the incident” but explained that 
officers’ actions at an earlier time would not necessarily make their actions 
in later stages unreasonable.208  The Sixth Circuit generally supports this 
analysis.209 
a.  A Segmented View of Totality of the Circumstances:  Individual Stages 
of Reasonableness 
The Seventh Circuit created this segmentation framework in Plakas, in 
which it held the defendant, Deputy Jeffrey Drinski, reasonably fatally shot 
the decedent Konstantino Plakas in light of the circumstances as a whole.210  
Police first encountered Plakas as he walked along the road after his car had 
crashed into a ditch.211  Police smelled alcohol on his breath and drove him 
back to the scene, and he agreed to go to the sheriff’s department to submit 
to a test for intoxication.212  After one officer frisked and handcuffed him, 
Plakas said the handcuffs hurt the burn scars on his chest.213  Plakas then 
entered the police car after the officer explained that the officer must follow 
department policy.214 
While driving to the sheriff’s department, the officer hit the brakes when 
he heard the rear door open and saw Plakas fleeing.215  Police followed 
Plakas to his fiancée’s home, where he claimed the officer hurt him.216  
Plakas then grabbed a poker and struck the officer on the wrist.217  Deputy 
Drinski, arriving later, saw Plakas leave the house and followed him with his 
gun drawn.218  Deputy Drinski and two other officers pursued Plakas to a 
clearing in the woods.219  Still holding the poker, Plakas said his burn scars 
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hurt and allegedly stated, “Either you’re going to die here or I’m going to die 
here.”220  Plakas then ran toward Deputy Drinski and Deputy Drinski shot 
Plakas in the chest.221  Deputy Drinski believed a tree prevented him from 
retreating as Plakas ran toward him.222 
As in Abraham, Deputy Drinski argued and the court emphasized that this 
excessive force case involved force used for self-defense rather than to 
prevent escape.223  The court held that Deputy Drinski acted reasonably when 
he shot Plakas.224  It analyzed the circumstances by dividing the incident into 
five stages to determine the reasonableness of police action at each stage.225  
First, the officers could have reasonably arrested Plakas for drunk driving 
after meeting Plakas on the road where he exhibited signs of intoxication.226  
Second, the officers reasonably pursued a person fleeing arrest.227  Third, the 
officers reasonably drew their firearms and aimed them at Plakas because he 
held a poker and injured one officer’s wrist.228  Fourth, it was reasonable for 
the officers to pursue Plakas to the forest clearing after he committed the 
violent offense against the officer.229  Fifth, Deputy Drinski tried to convince 
Plakas to drop the poker and surrender.230  Analyzing these segments, the 
court concluded that Deputy Drinski reasonably fired his weapon when 
Plakas charged at him with the poker.231  The court held that unreasonable 
police conduct at an earlier segment would not affect the reasonableness of 
later conduct because the court considers each segment individually.232  If 
conduct at four of the five stages was reasonable, unreasonable conduct at 
one stage would not render conduct at all stages unreasonable.233 
Yet, like Salim, Plakas did not discuss the totality of the circumstances 
standard.234  The Seventh Circuit found preseizure conduct irrelevant to the 
reasonableness analysis, but its application of this rule has been less 
definitive.235  The Seventh Circuit discussed previous temporal stages 
depicting Plakas’s behavior as relevant to the moment Deputy Drinski chose 
to shoot.236  The court highlighted not only Deputy Drinski’s attempt to talk 
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with Plakas but also other officers’ conduct, from the first stage to the last.237  
Consequently, the court did not completely disregard all the actions leading 
up to the seizure.238 
The court cited Tom v. Voida239 as a “classic example” of the application 
of the segmented approach.240  An officer stopped to help Tom who had 
fallen from a bicycle; Tom fled, and the officer pursued.241  Tom pushed the 
officer’s head into the concrete and ran.242  The officer warned Tom three 
times, “[p]lease.  Don’t make me shoot you,” before eventually shooting 
when Tom lunged.243  The court did not restrict its analysis to the moment 
the officer drew her weapon and shot Tom when Tom lunged.244  The court 
included Tom’s and the officer’s previous actions, from the moment the 
officer saw Tom fall on the street and tried to help, through the chase and 
Tom’s violent behavior, to the moment seizure occurred when the officer 
shot Tom.245 
b.  Arguments for the Seventh Circuit’s Framework:  Split-Second 
Judgments and the Legally Relevant Time Frame 
One argument for the segmented approach posits that, like the Second 
Circuit’s narrow approach, the Seventh Circuit’s method strictly follows 
Graham’s hesitation regarding the dangers and uncertainties officers face in 
civilian encounters and limits courts’ ability to second-guess officers’ split-
second decisions.246  The Seventh Circuit cautioned against second-guessing 
police because reviewing actions beyond the exact moment officers use force 
may always reveal different decisions they could have made that would have 
led to different outcomes.247 
In Plakas, the court explained that defining the legally relevant time frame 
of events, which may be quite short, is vital in excessive force cases.248  The 
court described split-second decision-making as the “briefest reflection” 
officers make before deciding to shoot someone fatally.249  The court noted 
that officers who perceive danger to their own lives would not think about 
nonlethal alternatives in that moment, even though they have alternatives; for 
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instance, Deputy Drinski could have retreated or used a colleague’s tear 
gas.250  The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police to 
use the least deadly, or even less deadly, alternatives as long as their 
particular use of force is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.251 
One scholar recognized that a “strength of the segmented approach” is that 
it provides flexibility to adjust the reasonableness analysis to complex and 
changing situations.252  However, this scholar also noted that this flexibility 
can lead to inconsistent results and does not sufficiently account for the 
relationship between a series of events that has resulted in the use of force.253 
B.  Canadian Law Comparison:  De-escalation Measures, Preseizure 
Conduct, and the “Reasonable Grounds” Standard 
This part analyzes Canadian excessive force cases in light of the U.S. 
circuit courts’ broad, narrow, and segmented approaches.  In addition to its 
geographic proximity, other factors render Canadian jurisprudence a useful 
point of comparison.  Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
rights akin to the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.254  Canadian law also authorizes police to employ 
lethal force only when they reasonably believe suspects pose an imminent 
threat of serious injury or death to officers or others.255 
Further, the Canadian government does not generally have a systematic 
method to document encounters between police and the public where force 
is used,256 just as the United States does not have an official national database 
to record police-involved deaths.257  The Canadian government tracks fatal 
police shootings if the officer is criminally charged.258  However, in the 
province of Ontario, as of January 1, 2020, the Anti-Racism Act259 requires 
the Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General to collect data on the race of 
individuals involved in use-of-force incidents to identify and monitor 
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potential racial bias in policing.260  When officers use a firearm or other 
weapon, Ontario police must complete a “Use of Force Report.”261 
In Canada, much like in the United States, the effects of police use of force 
are felt disproportionately by race and by gender.262  Black and Indigenous 
Canadians are more likely to be killed by police than non-Black or non-
Indigenous Canadians.263  Black individuals comprised 2.92 percent of the 
Canadian population over the past twenty years but were 8.63 percent of 
civilian deaths caused by police.264  Indigenous persons comprised only 4.21 
percent of the Canadian population but were 16 percent of deaths caused by 
police.265  In addition, a Statistics Canada study found that in 2012, one in 
five people who had a police encounter had a mental disability.266 
1.  Police Use of Force in the United States and Canada 
Despite the similarities, stark contrasts exist between police use of force in 
the United States and Canada.  There are generally far fewer civilian deaths 
caused by police in Canada than in the United States.267  The first 
comprehensive analysis of fatal encounters with Canadian police, using data 
from ten major police forces, found that 461 fatal police encounters occurred 
from 2000 to 2017.268 
This number is much lower than the 999 fatal police encounters in the 
United States in 2019,269 which may be partly due to the nations’ different 
population sizes.270  As another striking example, in 2017, Winnipeg, 
Canada, saw only five police shootings of civilians, two of which resulted in 
deaths.271  Canadian police training may partly explain the fewer deaths 
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because it focuses on de-escalation, rather than confrontation.272  Toronto 
Police Service data show that of 30,000 encounters with suspects in 2017, 
Toronto police used force in only around 0.5 percent.273 
CBC News data suggests that Canadian police fatally shoot an average of 
approximately nineteen civilians per year.274  Of the 461 civilians killed by 
police from 2000 to 2017, approximately 116 were unarmed and nearly two-
thirds were killed when police shot them.275  One law enforcement scholar at 
Canada’s Simon Fraser University has stated that people have a higher 
chance of surviving encounters with Canadian police than with U.S. 
police.276 
Another important difference is the greater availability of firearms in the 
United States.277  According to the Small Arms Survey, the United States had 
over 393 million civilian-held guns in 2017 (about 46 percent of the 
worldwide total) but Canada had only about thirteen million.278  Canada also 
has a far lower gun crime rate.279  American police may be more likely to 
employ greater degrees of force because people they encounter are more 
likely to have guns.280 
2.  The Canadian Charter and Criminal Code 
In 1982, the United Kingdom enacted the Canada Act of 1982, which 
incorporated the Constitution Act of 1982 and ended the U.K. Parliament’s 
legislative authority over Canada.281  Part I of the Constitution Act of 1982 
set out the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”), 
constitutionalizing fundamental rights and freedoms for any person in 
Canada in matters related to government action.282 
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Section 7 of the Charter guarantees “life, liberty and security of person,” 
and Section 8 provides the “right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure.”283  Section 24(1) delineates the right to bring suit when “rights or 
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied.”284 
In Canadian law, “seizure” is defined narrowly.285  Under section 8, 
seizure is the “taking of a thing from a person by a public authority without 
that person’s consent.”286  Courts employ a totality of the circumstances test 
to determine whether seizure of such property is reasonable.287 
Section 7 protections of liberty often refer to guarding persons in a 
physical sense in incidents of physical restraint, such as imprisonment,288 or 
state actions affecting one’s ability to move freely.289  The purpose of section 
7 is to conform government activities interfering with “life, liberty and 
security” to principles of “justice and fair process.”290  Courts examine 
section 7 in two steps:  (1) whether a government actor deprived someone of 
life, liberty, or security of the person; and (2) whether the deprivation 
conformed to fundamental principles of justice.291 
Plaintiffs must show a “sufficient causal connection” between the alleged 
government action and the deprivation of life, liberty, or security.292  
Plaintiffs satisfy this standard by establishing a reasonable inference by 
balancing probabilities.293  Courts focus on the right to life where a 
defendant’s action directly or indirectly caused death or increased the risk of 
death.294 
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Unlike in the United States, in Canada, criminal law falls exclusively 
within the federal jurisdiction.295  Under section 25(1) of Canada’s Criminal 
Code, law enforcement, including private persons and peace officers, may 
use “as much [legally authorized] force as is necessary.”296  Section 25 
shields officers from criminal or civil liability only if the law sufficiently 
justified their uses of force.297  Under the “reasonable grounds” standard, 
officers have legal authorization to exercise force if they reasonably believe 
that using force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm is necessary to 
protect officers or others from death or serious harm.298 
In addition to requiring reasonable grounds for officers to employ 
necessary force, the code lists certain considerations for analyzing whether 
the use of force was justified.299  The Canada Criminal Code factors include:  
whether police arrested the suspect with or without a warrant, the suspect’s 
alleged offense, whether the suspect fled to avoid arrest, whether such flight 
could reasonably be prevented by less violent means (unlike U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent),300 and whether officers reasonably believed the degree of 
force was necessary to protect officers and others from imminent or future 
death or serious bodily harm.301 
Finally, section 26 of the code explicitly states that all law enforcement 
officers who are authorized to use force are “criminally responsible for any 
excess thereof according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes 
the excess.”302  Thus, permissible police interference with individual liberty, 
including exerting nondeadly or deadly force against a person, must be no 
more than what is reasonably necessary to prevent death or serious harm to 
officers or others.303 
The next section highlights elements in Canadian use-of-force cases as 
they align with or differ from the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits. 
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3.  Circumstances Canadian Courts Consider 
In Canada, a holistic view of the context is relevant to determining the 
reasonableness of an officer’s actions in excessive force claims,304 similar to 
the Third Circuit’s Fourth Amendment standard.305  To decide the 
reasonableness of police use of force in an arrest, in R. v. Nasogaluak,306 the 
Supreme Court of Canada looked not only at the immediate moment officers 
exerted force but also at an earlier point in time when police received a tip 
about an intoxicated driver.307  In a case where a court analyzed two instances 
of police forcibly taking an emotionally disturbed man to a hospital, the 
Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador even examined a phone call 
a bystander had had with an officer long before officers arrived on the 
scene.308  When analyzing the reasonableness of police conduct in the 
excessive force claim, the court focused on events preceding the moment at 
issue, including the police conduct that led to the use of force.309  In another 
case, to determine the reasonableness of an officer firing a projectile to 
suppress a riot, the court found the officer’s training, experience, and orders 
of the day relevant to the reasonable grounds analysis and that a judge should 
be a “doppelganger” to officers, accompanying them throughout relevant 
events.310 
In Canada, whether police attempt to de-escalate the situation also plays a 
role in evaluating excessive force claims, and this evaluation involves 
reviewing officers’ preseizure conduct.311  In 2013, after the fatal shooting 
of an eighteen-year-old Toronto civilian armed with a switchblade knife, the 
Ontario ombudsman312 began investigating Ontario police de-escalation 
training for situations where force might be used.313  In 2014, the Toronto 
 
 304. See Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 168 (Can.) (“[W]here the state’s 
interest is not simply law enforcement as, for instance, where state security is involved, or 
where the individual’s interest is not simply his expectation of privacy as, for instance, when 
the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant standard might well be a different one.”). 
 305. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 306. 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 (Can.). 
 307. Id. para. 10. 
 308. See generally Meadus v. Royal Nfld. Constabulary Pub. Complaints Comm’n, 335 
NFLD & P.E.I.R. 46 (Can. Nfld. Sup. Ct. Trial Div. (Gen.)). 
 309. Id. 
 310. See Berntt v. Vancouver (City), 1999 CarswellBC 1197, paras. 24–25 (Can. B.C. 
C.A.) (WL). 
 311. See Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, para. 10; see also Kevin Cyr, Police Use of Force:  
Assessing Necessity and Proportionality, 53 ALTA. L. REV. 663, 666–67 (2016) (asserting that 
whether “police attempt to de-escalate situations before using force is either an increasing 
expectation by the public and the courts, or one that is becoming more clearly defined” and 
that “[t]his increased focus on de-escalation has resulted in tangible new requirements placed 
on the police”). 
 312. See Ombudsman, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/ombudsman [https://perma.cc/3VZG-ZG49] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (defining 
ombudsman as “a government official . . . appointed to receive and investigate complaints 
made by individuals against abuses or capricious acts of public officials”). 
 313. See generally PAUL DUBÉ, OMBUDSMAN OF ONT. A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH 
(2016), https://www.ombudsman.on.ca/Files/sitemedia/Documents/OntarioOmbudsman 
DeescalationEN_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4KS-J2DC]. 
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Police Service asked Justice Frank Iacobucci, a former justice of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, to review its lethal force training and policies, especially 
with mentally disabled individuals.314  Justice Iacobucci’s findings focused 
on de-escalation tactics.315  The report emphasized that force must be 
reasonably necessary in the circumstances and “should always be a last 
resort” because “[r]esolving conflicts through communication rather than 
force is the goal.”316 
As a result of this increased focus on de-escalation, Canadian policing 
policies have changed.317  For example, British Columbia implemented a 
policy under which officers must first try to de-escalate a situation before 
using conducted electrical weapon tasers.318  One scholar, a former member 
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for fourteen years, reasoned that other 
exercises of force, not only tasers, should create an obligation to de-escalate 
before using force.319  In addition, the Edmonton Police Service and 
University of Alberta researchers explored ways to improve police 
encounters with mentally disabled individuals and helped train officers in 
communication and de-escalation techniques.320  Within six months, deadly 
and nondeadly force used toward people with mental disabilities decreased 
by over 40 percent, although other initiatives may have contributed to the 
decrease as well.321 
Canadian courts recognize that police endure certain intense and quickly 
changing situations, just as Salim emphasized based on Graham and 
Garner.322  Like Graham, Berntt v. Vancouver (City)323 warned against 
judges analyzing officer conduct through twenty-twenty hindsight.324  The 
Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that “the police are often required 
to make split-second decisions in fluid and potentially dangerous 
 
 314. FRANK IACOBUCCI, TORONTO POLICE SERV., POLICE ENCOUNTERS WITH PEOPLE IN 
CRISIS 14 (2014), https://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/reports/police_ 
encounters_with_people_in_crisis_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NRC-L5MB]. 
 315. Id. at 17, 153. 
 316. Id. at 194. 
 317. See, e.g., Olivia Bowden, Tory Tables ‘Sweeping’ Reforms to Toronto Police, 
Including Budget Reallocation, CBC (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ 
toronto/tory-police-reform-1.5681916 [https://perma.cc/N4NM-ZK48]. 
 318. See Provincial Policing Standards, B.C. 2 (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www2.gov.bc.ca/ 
assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/police/standards/1-3-1-threshold-and-
circumstances-of-use.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YWU-CFME]. 
 319. See Cyr, supra note 311, at 667. 
 320. Id. at 667–68; Yasmeen I. Krameddine & Peter H. Silverstone, How to Improve 
Interactions Between Police and the Mentally Ill, FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY, Jan. 2015, at 1, 1. 
 321. Krameddine & Silverstone, supra note 320, at 2 (explaining that other initiatives 
included training to increase empathy and verbal and nonverbal communication). 
 322. See, e.g., R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, para. 35, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 228 (Can.) 
(noting policing is dangerous and mandates quick reactions in emergencies); R. v. Bottrell, 
1981 CanLII 339, para. 14 (Can. B.C. C.A.) (cautioning against using hindsight). 
 323. 1997 CarswellBC 320 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (WL), rev’d 1999 CarswellBC 1197 (Can. 
B.C. C.A.) (WL). 
 324. See id. para. 108 (“It is one thing to have the time in a trial over several days to 
reconstruct and examine the events . . . .  It is another to be a policeman in the middle of [an 
emergency].”). 
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situations.”325  While requiring police to use the least force necessary to 
arrest or otherwise seize suspects may place police and others in unnecessary 
danger,326 courts also recognize that inappropriate police action where an 
officer unreasonably deviates from established training is an important aspect 
to consider in assessing reasonableness.327 
In Puricelli v. Toronto Police Services Board,328 the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice found that police should “explain why an obvious alternative 
but less dangerous course of action was not taken.”329  The inclusion of 
officer conduct that may have provoked later force in the analysis of the 
circumstances suggests that police should try to avoid creating exigent 
circumstances by initially utilizing less forceful alternatives.330 
III.  THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S CAUSALLY RELEVANT APPROACH IS TRUEST TO 
GRAHAM’S TOTALITY LANGUAGE 
This part proposes that the best approach to assessing the totality of the 
circumstances in measuring the reasonableness of officer conduct in 
plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive force claims is the Third Circuit’s broad 
approach, which includes both officers’ and plaintiffs’ causally relevant 
preseizure conduct.  It further concludes that circuit courts should adopt 
Canada’s emphasis on de-escalation so that officers’ adherence to or 
deviation from de-escalation training will be a causally relevant factor that 
weighs heavily in the reasonableness analysis. 
When courts consider the reasonableness of the use of deadly force, how 
explicitly should they consider opportunities for using nondeadly force to 
neutralize or avoid the alleged threat?  Incorporating the Third Circuit’s 
causal method, particularly, weighing de-escalation as a significant relevant 
factor, would allow the circuits to formalize this variable in a tangible way. 
Part III.A compares the strengths and weaknesses of the three circuit 
approaches and discusses why the Third Circuit’s approach best assesses the 
totality of the circumstances in measuring the reasonableness of officer 
conduct in excessive force claims.  Part III.B examines the importance of 
including de-escalation training as a relevant causal factor and accompanying 
policy considerations. 
 
 325. See R. v. Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66, para. 40, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 408, 421 (Can.). 
 326. See Anderson v. Smith, 2000 CarswellBC 1651, para. 51 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (WL) 
(“There is no requirement to use the least amount of force because this may expose the officer 
to unnecessary danger to himself.”). 
 327. See generally R. v. Power (2016), 476 Sask. R. 91 (Can. Sask. C.A.) (including in the 
reasonableness analysis whether the force used by a constable was in accordance with the 
training provided to police officers); see also Cyr, supra note 311, at 668. 
 328. [2014] O.J. No. 5638 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J. Div.). 
 329. Id. para. 40 (quoting Chartier v. Greaves, [2001] O.J. No. 634, para. 64 (Can. Ont. 
Super. Ct. J. Div.)). 
 330. See Cyr, supra note 311, at 668. 
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A.  Preseizure Conduct:  Vital to Assessing Reasonableness 
As reflected in the Third Circuit’s broad approach, understanding a 
suspect’s and officer’s preseizure actions may be critical to decide the 
reasonableness of the use of force.  The Second Circuit’s narrow approach 
does not fully encompass Graham’s notion of totality in assessing the 
situation where an officer employed deadly or nondeadly force to seize.331  
Limiting factors only to the precise moment of seizure separates facts from 
the rest of the story.332  If the Second Circuit in Salim had considered that the 
five people surrounding the officer were children and that the officer wore 
plain clothes when chasing young Reyes and fired a shot before pinning 
Reyes to the ground, violating police protocol, the court might have found 
the shooting unreasonable under the circumstances as a whole.333 
In another case, the Second Circuit disregarded that the suspect threatened 
to shoot police minutes before they seized him.334  The police believed the 
suspect concealed something behind his back when they entered the 
premises.335  Thus, applying the “exact moment of seizure” method would 
exclude context that may be important to determine the reasonableness of 
conduct at the moment police employed force. 
In Scott v. Harris,336 the Supreme Court questioned whether preseizure 
conduct that influences the need for force is irrelevant for the reasonableness 
analysis.337  In Scott, the suspect created a need for increased force by leading 
police on a high-speed chase through a crowded town.338  The Court found 
the deputy’s use of force, pushing his vehicle’s bumper into the suspect’s car 
to end the dangerous chase, reasonable.339  In its reasonableness analysis, the 
Court stated that the parties’  “[c]ulpability is relevant.”340  While Scott does 
not overrule Salim, its ruling does suggest that because a suspect’s preseizure 
conduct is relevant, this reasoning may similarly be extended to officers’ 
preseizure conduct.341 
Further, the causation method of analyzing particular circumstances, 
including preseizure actions, may be applied more evenly for both parties, 
without unduly favoring one over the other.342  In contrast, the segmented 
 
 331. See Avery, supra note 66, at 280–83. 
 332. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the defendant 
emphasized the plaintiff’s resistance as important context for analyzing the officer’s force). 
 333. See Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 334. O’Bert ex rel. Est. of O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 335. Id. at 34. 
 336. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 337. Id. at 383–84. 
 338. Id. at 372. 
 339. Id. at 384. 
 340. Id. at 384 n.10. 
 341. See Fortunati v. Campagne, 681 F. Supp. 2d 528, 543 n.13 (D. Vt. 2009) (stating that, 
as the Court in Scott considered the suspect’s culpable conduct creating the need for force, 
courts could also consider whether “police created the need for force” and that Scott at least 
questions the scope of Salim’s holding), aff’d sub nom., Fortunati v. Vermont, 503 F. App’x 
78 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 342. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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approach selectively considers certain preseizure conduct but disregards 
police provocation.343  The Seventh Circuit looks more at the plaintiff’s 
preseizure conduct than the defendant’s, which may favor defendants and 
result in courts applying the segmented approach unevenly among the 
parties.344  Some may argue that considering antecedent conduct allows for 
impermissible second-guessing of officers’ discretion using hindsight.  
However, as proponents of the causation method emphasize, what officers 
did or did not do before employing force is relevant to the totality of the 
circumstances, and fact finders considering plaintiffs’ preseizure conduct 
should consider officers’ conduct as well.345 
Ignoring police actions before nondeadly or deadly force in the totality of 
the circumstances context ignores the balance of interests Garner requires.346  
Not all police encounters are split-second decisions.347  While police 
provocation of force through noncompliance with procedure may establish 
negligence and not a constitutional violation, Garner and Graham did not 
preclude arguably unreasonable preseizure conduct from being part of the 
totality of the circumstances.348  Therefore, analyses like the Second 
Circuit’s framework, which only examines the immediate moment officers 
shoot or use force, interpret totality of the circumstances too narrowly.349 
Similarly, Plakas demonstrated one difficulty of applying its segmented 
method:  separating Deputy Drinski’s knowledge of Plakas and the situation 
in earlier stages from the final deadly stage.350  It may be challenging to 
choose exactly at which moments to divide the time frame, which may create 
inconsistencies or even lead litigants to raise questions concerning 
arbitrariness.351 
For example, Deering v. Reich352 deviated from the Plakas approach by 
employing a more expansive time frame.353  In Deering, at 12:45 a.m., three 
deputies went to arrest Reinhold Deering, an elderly person who had been 
formerly committed to a psychiatric hospital, for failing to appear in court 
for a misdemeanor property damage charge stemming from backing his 
vehicle into a parked motorcycle.354  After police knocked, Deering fired a 
 
 343. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 15–17. 
 344. See id. 
 345. See id.; see also Lee, supra note 159, at 686. 
 346. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985). 
 347. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 10. 
 348. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (“[R]easonableness depends on not only when a seizure is 
made, but also how it is carried out.”); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 349. See, e.g., Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Kimber, supra 
note 157, at 665. 
 350. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 351. See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 291–92 (stating that with the segmented framework, courts 
have no “principled way of explaining when ‘pre-seizure’ events start and, consequently, will 
not have any defensible justification for why conduct prior to that chosen moment should be 
excluded”); see also Zouhary, supra note 246, at 17. 
 352. 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 353. See id. at 650. 
 354. See id. at 648. 
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shotgun at the officers.355  After repeatedly ordering Deering to lower the 
weapon, an officer shot and killed Deering.356  In analyzing the 
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, the court considered not just 
moments immediately before and during the seizure but also the crime, the 
warrant and its service, the officer’s perception of danger, and what the 
officer knew about the suspect.357  Despite the defendant’s argument that the 
court should not consider preseizure conduct—such as Deering’s mental 
state and age, the late time, and Deering’s living on an isolated farm—the 
court found such information relevant.358 
This different application of the segmented approach shows the challenge 
of deciding when relevant factors begin when deconstructing the time line.359  
Courts may find it difficult to draw temporal lines in situations that may span 
from one or two minutes to multiple hours.360  This dissection can be 
arbitrary.  In contrast, the Third Circuit recognizes all factors bearing on 
officers’ uses of force and weighs the importance of each based on causation, 
rather than when the seizure occurred; by not having to cherry-pick which 
parts of the preforce time line are relevant, the Third Circuit’s approach 
avoids the appearance of arbitrariness.361 
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s approach does not consider when 
officers’ actions contributed to the need for force.362  The Plakas court held 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit “creating unreasonably dangerous 
circumstances” when arresting or otherwise seizing suspects.363 
Further, the court recognized that all time frames begin with police 
deciding to assist, arrest, question, and so on.364  The court reasoned, “In a 
sense, the police officer always causes the trouble.  But it is trouble which 
the police officer is sworn to cause.”365  The court acknowledged that 
defendant-officers in excessive force claims are often the only living 
witnesses because they have killed the person most likely to contradict their 
views of the relevant facts.366  Yet, the Plakas court found that officers at the 
scene were sufficient witnesses to corroborate the defendant’s version of the 
circumstances, despite the plaintiff’s arguments that a photograph suggested 
the clearing provided ample room for Deputy Drinski to move safely away 
 
 355. See id. 
 356. See id. 
 357. See id. at 652. 
 358. See id. at 650. 
 359. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 17 (stating that the segmented approach presents a 
practical problem where courts have difficulty deciding which events to consider). 
 360. See id. at 23. 
 361. See McClellan, supra note 164, at 22–23 (“While courts that apply the segmented 
approach struggle to analyze the relationship between a series of events, principles of 
proximate causation provide workable rules for interpreting how to impose liability when a 
series of events interact to produce a result.”). 
 362. See Zouhary, supra note 246, at 11. 
 363. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Carter v. Buscher, 973 
F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 364. Id. at 1150. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. at 1147. 
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from Plakas’s poker.367  Thus, the segmented approach is too rigid because 
it excludes causal and contextual factors that may have impacted the seizure. 
Plaintiffs in excessive force claims often do not argue unjustified police 
use of force at the moment seizure occurred but that police conduct—
violating department policy or not using less violent alternatives—increased 
the need for force and, therefore, was unreasonable and excessive.368  
William Blackstone explained that reasonable deadly force constitutes an act 
of “unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention, or desire, and without 
any inadvertence or negligence . . . .  But the law must require it, otherwise 
it is not justifiable.”369  A standard most true to “unavoidable necessity,” also 
emphasized in Canada’s Criminal Code and case law,370 must use officers’ 
preseizure conduct as a key factor, especially in excessive force claims 
involving deadly force.  In the causally relevant test analyzing 
reasonableness, courts should consider whether officers tried nonlethal 
alternatives. 
In Brower v. County of Inyo,371 the Supreme Court found that a roadblock 
the suspect fatally crashed into constituted a seizure and remanded the case 
for the lower court to determine whether police unreasonably constructed and 
designed that roadblock.372  This holding supports the use of preseizure 
conduct when analyzing reasonableness.373  In St. Hilaire v. City of 
Laconia,374 the First Circuit interpreted Brower as holding that once courts 
find seizure occurred, they should examine officers’ actions leading up to the 
seizure.375  The Third Circuit agreed with this interpretation.376  While 
Brower does not designate where to begin the time line and which preseizure 
actions are most significant,377 the Third Circuit’s causation test does. 
The Third Circuit’s method would also help resolve issues with 
discrepancies between parties’ versions of events.  How courts determine 
whose version to credit when conducting the reasonableness calculus is 
important.  In excessive force cases, there is often only one side of the story 
available because the witness for the other side is dead.378  In Murrietta-
Golding v. City of Fresno,379 Isiah Murrietta Golding’s mother asserted that 
 
 367. Id. 
 368. See Kimber, supra note 157, at 653–54. 
 369. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *132. 
 370. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 25(4). 
 371. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
 372. See id. at 599–600. 
 373. See Kimber, supra note 157, at 653–54. 
 374. 71 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 375. Id. at 26. 
 376. Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 292 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]f preceding conduct could 
not be considered, remand in Brower would have been pointless, for the only basis for saying 
the seizure was unreasonable was the police’s pre-seizure planning and conduct.”). 
 377. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 598–600. 
 378. See Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A] defendant knows that 
the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach.”). 
 379. No. 18-CV-0314, 2020 WL 6075757 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020); see also Complaint 
for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2, at 
2. 
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Isiah portrayed no violent behavior throughout the pursuit, and the officers 
had no reason to believe Isiah was armed.380  According to Isiah’s mother, 
the defendants stated they saw Isiah touch his waistband several times while 
running.381  The Fresno County District Attorney’s Office, Fresno’s Office 
of Independent Review, and the Fresno Police Department’s Internal Affairs 
Bureau determined that the officers acted within policy because they saw 
Isiah do so.382  The plaintiff alleged that, being small, Isiah was simply trying 
to hold up his pants.383  The causal approach with a de-escalation factor 
would mitigate differences in litigants’ views by including preseizure choices 
and training. 
B.  Using Police Training and De-escalation to Evaluate Officers’ 
Preseizure Conduct 
In recent years, U.S. police departments have tightened their rules on using 
nondeadly and deadly force.384  Some authorize deadly force only as a last 
resort.385  Many departments prohibit officers from shooting at moving 
vehicles unless the vehicle is being used as a deadly weapon.386  Chicago 
Police Department data show that changes in its use of force rules and 
training that emphasized de-escalation and nonlethal alternatives reduced 
officer-involved shootings from sixty-three in 2016 to forty-five in 2017.387 
Many U.S. police departments have adopted more detailed use-of-force 
policies and training beyond the constitutional minimum.388  More 
departments are adopting policies emphasizing de-escalation measures, and 
such policies in Canada effectively decreased civilian deaths by police.389  
 
 380. Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury 
Trial, supra note 2, at 7. 
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 383. Complaint for Damages, Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, and Demand for Jury 
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 384. See McClellan, supra note 164, at 30–31. 
 385. See, e.g., General Order G03-02:  Use of Force, CHI. POLICE DEP’T DIRECTIVES SYS. 
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[https://perma.cc/U8GR-E92Q] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
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[https://perma.cc/Z74X-XA79]; see also Model Use of Force Policy, CAMPAIGN ZERO, 
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07c/1576009400070/Campaign+Zero+Model+Use+of+Force+Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
389D-RW6W] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 387. See James, supra note 258. 
 388. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 36 (2016), https:// 
www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW7N-
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 389. See, e.g., Policy 1115:  Use of Force, BALT. POLICE DEP’T 6 (Nov. 24, 2019), 
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De-escalation is a central issue in use-of-force policies.390  One study found 
many departments have adopted detailed de-escalation tactics to minimize 
the need for force, some through Department of Justice (DOJ) 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141 consent decrees, which delineate effective policing tactics.391  
Consent decrees are court-ordered agreements between DOJ and law 
enforcement agencies after a DOJ investigation to correct long-standing 
patterns of misconduct within police departments.392  Consequently, federal 
courts’ standards for assessing reasonableness in excessive force claims 
should include a focus on de-escalation.  If officers significantly deviated 
from department de-escalation procedures in their actions leading up to a 
seizure, those choices should weigh more heavily toward unreasonableness.  
This Note defines de-escalation as the same tactic defined by the 2017 
National Consensus Policy on Use of Force, which defined de-escalation as 
acting or communicating “to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy 
of the threat so that more time, options, and resources can be called upon to 
resolve the situation without the use of force or with a reduction in the force 
necessary.” 393  The policy further stated that de-escalation may include the 
use of certain techniques, such as “command presence, advisements, 
warnings, verbal persuasion, and tactical repositioning.”394 
Many of the policies adopted by police departments have been advocated 
by groups such as Campaign Zero, which advocates more restrictive use-of-
force policies to reduce injury or loss of life for both civilians and police.395  
Campaign Zero has studied different police departments to see which policies 
reduced the need for force.396  The study found that police departments with 
 
de-escalation as a core principle and directing that “[m]embers shall, unless it is not possible 
to do so, avoid the Use of Force by using De-Escalation Techniques”); NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
POLICY ON USE OF FORCE 3 (2017), https://www.nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/National_ 
Consensus_Policy_on_Use_of_Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL5S-QK37] (advocating that 
officers “shall use de-escalation techniques and other alternatives . . . whenever possible and 
appropriate before resorting to force and to reduce the need for force”). 
 390. See POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., supra note 388, at 40; see also POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., 
CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE:  LESSONS LEARNED 14 (2013), https:// 
www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/civil%20rights%20investigations%
20of%20local%20police%20-%20lessons%20learned%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TLA-
B6D7]. 
 391. See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. 
REV. 211, 286–88 (2017). 
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more restrictive policies killed fewer people and police were less likely to be 
assaulted or killed in the line of duty.397  The most effective policies included 
requiring comprehensive reporting and requiring officers to exhaust all other 
alternatives before shooting, which decreased civilian deaths by 25 
percent.398  Requiring de-escalation reduced killings by 15 percent, and 
requiring a warning before shooting reduced deaths by 5 percent.399  Yet, 
only thirty-four of the ninety-one police departments studied required de-
escalation techniques when possible before using force and thirty-one called 
for officers to exhaust all other reasonable alternatives before utilizing 
nondeadly or deadly force.400 
Campaign Zero proposed a model use-of-force policy that recommends 
training similar to Canada’s and the Seattle Police Department’s policy 
highlighting tactics to gain a suspect’s submission through nonlethal 
methods.401  The proposed procedures include:  de-escalation, 
communication from safe positions, calming agitated subjects, calling 
officers with nonlethal tools, and avoiding physical conflict unless 
“immediately necessary” to prevent harm to officers and bystanders.402 
In an article analyzing how to measure the totality of the circumstances of 
police seizures of mentally disabled individuals, Professor Michael Avery 
highlighted the importance of training in nonlethal tactics and concluded 
courts should follow the Third Circuit’s approach to include officers’ 
preseizure choices that influenced the necessity of resorting to such force.403  
Professor Avery recommended courts consider police training and 
emphasized that effective training minimizes split-second decision-
making.404  Similarly, the Court in Garner found it relevant to examine 
department policies throughout the nation to consider the constitutionality of 
using deadly force to stop fleeing felons.405 
Recent state-law developments demonstrate the importance of a uniform 
circuit approach that includes preseizure conduct and de-escalation in the 
totality of the circumstances.  Maryland House Bill 166, introduced in 
January of 2020, would expand the time frame of the relevant circumstances 
and allow fact finders to consider whether officers attempted to de-escalate 
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the situation before using deadly force.406  The bill adds three factors fact 
finders must consider as part of the totality of the circumstances:  (1) whether 
the suspect possessed or appeared to possess a deadly weapon and refused to 
comply with officers’ orders reasonably related to public safety, such as to 
drop the weapon; (2) whether officers used de-escalation measures, such as 
using nonlethal alternatives, before using deadly force; and (3) whether 
officers’ preseizure conduct increased the risk of subsequent use of deadly 
force.407 
Adding de-escalation to the totality of the circumstances expands the force 
of law to department policies that already integrate de-escalation training.408  
Including de-escalation as a factor in assessing reasonableness would 
encourage officers to de-escalate a situation before using force, while still 
recognizing that officers often make quick decisions in rapidly changing 
situations that may not always be correct.409 
The effectiveness of more stringent policies adopted by U.S. police 
departments and Canadian police training with a focus on de-escalation 
indicate that applying the Third Circuit’s framework, in which de-escalation 
constitutes a significant factor, would provide a consistent and more 
practicable method for evaluating the reasonableness of police conduct in 
light of the totality of the circumstances.  The totality of the circumstances 
should include preseizure conduct and the availability of alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit’s causal approach and emphasis on de-escalation 
provide tangible benefits.  Through familiar causation analysis, courts may 
analyze relevant interactions between officers and individuals before and at 
the moment of seizure as part of the totality of the circumstances.  A 
causation framework that considers both parties’ relevant preseizure conduct, 
with an emphasis on de-escalation, provides an objective rule for courts to 
measure the reasonableness of officers’ force. 
This framework would avoid favoring one party over another and would 
decrease the disproportionate risk of the police’s use of force on young 
people of color and people with mental disabilities.  Adding whether officers 
employed de-escalation measures as a factor does not create an overly 
burdensome requirement, as illustrated by the Canadian courts’ approach.  
Rather, it would guide judicial analysis in light of established policies and 
procedures adopted by police departments throughout the United States.  
Incorporating preseizure conduct and de-escalation truly evaluates the 
totality of the circumstances to advance both officers’ and civilians’ safety. 
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